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Abstract
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group mem-
bers in a group conict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members
to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and
complementarity in memberse¤orts, and analyze how each groups internal conict in-
uences its chance of winning in the external conict. We nd that a more symmetric
group may expend more e¤ort in external conict when the (common) collective action
technology exhibits a high degree of complementarity. Furthermore, depending on the
degree of complementarity, the stronger players relative contribution to external conict
may be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker
player to earn a higher payo¤. In absence of any complementarity, the rent-dissipation is
non-monotonic with the within-group power asymmetry.
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1 Introduction
Groups often engage in costly confrontations in order to win a reward, while at the same
time the group members contest with each other in order to divide the possible reward
among themselves. In such cases each group member often makes decision about exerting
costly e¤ort for the group collective action, and also about exerting costly e¤ort to compete
with own group members. In this article, we study such situations in the shadow of power
asymmetry among group members.
There are numerous examples from Political Economy. In an open-list electoral system,
a candidate expends resources to convince voters to vote for his party, and separately, to
choose himself as the candidate within his party (Ames, 1995). Interest groups compete for
rents from government policies while individuals - with possible unequal powers - within the
interest group contest for the spoils of the victory (Münster, 2007). When countries in an
alliance engage in conict against another alliance, they also need to decide how to share the
burden of costs. This logic works in the same way for the parties within a political alliance
(Konrad and Kovenock, 2009). It is also related to the long unanswered issue of the linkage
between internal and external conict in Political Science, and it is noted that "While a
variety of theoretical perspectives would argue for such linkages between internal and external
conict, di¢ cult questions continue to focus scholarly attention on this relationship" (Starr,
1994).
Similar examples can be drawn from Industrial and Organizational Economics. Firms
producing a system good as complements compete against another system and also divide
prots among themselves. Competing research joint ventures face the same issue. Employees
in an organization expend e¤orts collectively to overcome rival organizations, but at the same
time they compete with each other for promotions, bonuses and internal rents (Glazer, 2002).
Partners in an organization may compete with each other, as well as with outsider owners
to appropriate surplus (Müller and Wärneryd, 2001). Labor unions simultaneously confront
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the authority as well as other unions. But even within a union, workers sharing the same
political interest may conict upon ethnic issues (Dasgupta, 2009).1
In all these examples, the nature of internal conict simultaneously characterizes the shape
of external conict, in particular, through collective action between players within a group.2
This article analyzes how the inter-group conict interacts with intra-group conict in these
environments with special emphases on the power asymmetry between the group members
and complementarity in collective action. In a model of group contest, in which players expend
resources to both internal and external contest simultaneously and incur additive cost, we
use a stochastic (Tullock, 1980) contest success function, consider heterogeneity among group
members in terms of power asymmetry, and introduce complementarity in collective action
through a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) group impact function.3 Consequently,
the interplay between the internal and the external conict turns out to be a key feature in
the analysis of the overall contest.
There are two contrasting conventional wisdoms about the question of how each groups
internal conict inuences its chance of winning in external conict. One view suggests
that a group with less internal conict has an advantage in external conict against a rival
group (Deutsch, 1949). The other view is that intra-group conict is more conducive in
eliciting e¤orts from group members for external conict (Lüschen, 1970). The group contest
literature, in general, does not provide a denitive answer.
Most analyses in the group contest literature focus on issues related to contest design that
manipulates total rent dissipation by observing di¤erent impact functions, cost structures
and value distributions. This area of literature originated with Katz et al. (1990), who
1Various other important illustrations of such situations come from Biology. Even in nature, di¤erent
species compete for limited resources within and between species-type simultaneously (Vandermeer, 1975).
Sperm competition under polyandry reects another example of this structure. There are cases in which
sperms from a male bird compete with each other in fertilizing the ovum of a polyandric female bird, but at
the same time the sperms extract enzymes or take other collective actions that damage (at least the likelihood
of the success of) sperms of other males (Baker, 1996; Buckland-Nicks, 1998).
2This area of literature dates back to Olson (1965) and was later developed by Becker (1983), Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983), Hardin (1995) among others. This can also be interpreted as the collective action problem
in two potentially important environments: competition between groups and internal conict within a group.
See Ostrom (2000) and Sandler and Hartley (2001) for literature reviews.
3An impact function is a function that maps group membersindividual e¤orts to the group e¤ort(Wärn-
eryd, 1998). A group contest success function is a function that maps group e¤orts into the probability of
winning the contest (Münster, 2009).
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use a perfectly substitutable impact function. The group e¤ort enters in a Tullock contest
success function and the winner group is decided. They show that the equilibrium group
rent dissipation is unique, however multiple equilibria exist in terms of individual equilibrium
e¤orts. Baik (1993, 2008) generalizes the analysis by introducing asymmetric valuation within
groups. He shows that the equilibrium rent dissipation by a group depends crucially on the
distribution of prize valuation and not on the group size.4 Lee (2012) and Chowdhury et
al. (2013a) instead use weakest link and best-shot impact functions, respectively. Kolmer
and Rommeswinkel (2013) use a CES impact function ranging from weakest link to perfectly
substitute. Finally, Chowdhury and Topolyan (2013) analyze cases in which di¤erent groups
can follow di¤erent impact functions. These studies, however, do not model any internal
conict within the groups.5
There is an existing area of literature that considers both intra and inter group contest
(see, for example, Katz and Tokatlidu, 1996; Wärneryd, 1998; Stein and Rapoport, 2004).
However, most of the papers consider a sequence in within and between groups conicts,
i.e., the inter group conict is assumed to occur before the intra group conict (or the other
way round). Within this framework, important topics such as the e¤ects of introducing
an additional level of conict in scal federalism, organizational structure, ownership issues
etc. are analyzed. Unlike these studies, Hausken (2005) and Münster (2007) consider the
case in which the within and between group contests with Tullock contest success functions
occur simultaneously and the players are budget constrained. Hausken (2005) constructs a
model with perfectly substitute impact function in which group members expend resources
simultaneously to collective action and within group conict for a xed prize. He analyzes the
e¤ects of group size on equilibrium. He further compares the results with a model in which
players expend resources to produce the rent. This concept of allocating scarce resources into
production, inter-group conict and intra-group conict is later used also by Münster (2007)
with a CES impact function. In this model a negative correlation between the intensity
4A series of follow up analyses include Nitzan (1991), Esteban and Ray (2001), Niou and Tan (2005),
Inderst et al. (2008). Please see Konrad (2009) for a survey.
5All these studies use a stochastic contest success function. Group contests with deterministic (all-pay auc-
tion) contest success function is analyzed by Baik et al. (2001), and Topolyan (2013) for perfectly substitute,
Chowdhury et al. (2013b) for weakest link, and Barbieri et al. (2014) for best-shot impact function across
groups; and Chowdhury and Topolyan (2014) for heterogenous impact functions across group.
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of inter-group conict and that of intra-group conict is observed. Münster (2007) further
studies the optimal group size and the optimal number of groups from a contest designers
perspective.
Unlike the existing studies, our paper addresses the issue of the impact of the heterogeneity
within groups and complementarity on inter-group conict. At a technical level, we consider
linear costs for internal and external conicts and do not include a budget constraint. Given
this, we show that both the views of Deutsch (1949) and Lüschen (1970) have some validity by
clarifying the interaction between inter-group and intra-group contests. Furthermore, we ask
the following questions. Does internal conict matter in group members collective action
for external conict? Since the players are heterogeneous in terms of their within-group
power, which player is better o¤ within a group? How signicantly can the degree of power
asymmetry change the rent dissipation?
The severity of internal conicts within a group is measured in terms of the rate of rent
dissipation within intra-group conicts. Not surprisingly, as group members have similar
power, internal conict becomes more severe. In this sense, a more conictive group is
dened as one in which the power asymmetry is less. We nd (Proposition 1) that a stronger
players relative contribution to the external conict is higher for the group with a higher
degree of power asymmetry. Moreover, a more conictive group expends more e¤ort in the
inter-group conict, when the (common) collective action technology exhibits a higher degree
of complementarity (Proposition 2) . This is because each members incentive to contribute to
the collective action depends on ones equilibrium share of the prize in the internal conict.
Thus, when we compare the weaker individuals within groups, the individual in a more
conictive group is willing to contribute to collective action more than the one in a less
conictive group. The same logic holds for the stronger players. As a result, if individuals
e¤orts are relatively complementary in impacting the collective action, a more conictive
group faces a free-rider problem (in terms of not expending enough e¤ort in collective action)
at a lesser degree.
The answer to the question about whether a stronger player is better o¤ than a weaker
player within a group is not straightforward. Although the stronger player can dominate the
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weaker player in internal conict and have a larger share of the prize, the stronger player
usually also contributes more to collective action for external conict. Hence, when the col-
lective action technology is perfectly complementary, then the stronger player earns a higher
payo¤ than the weaker group member. But, when the technology is perfectly substitute,
this results in a non-monotonic relationship between the power asymmetry and the players
payo¤s (Lemma 3). A similar outcome (Proposition 4) holds for the relationship between the
power asymmetry and the total rent dissipation which is also non-monotonic with the power
asymmetry parameter for a perfectly substitute technology and is not maximized when the
players are symmetric. This result contrasts starkly to the standard (single) contest models
in which the rent dissipation gets smaller with player asymmetry.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model whereas
Section 3 constructs the equilibrium e¤orts both in inter- and intra-group conicts. We
consider the e¤ects of power asymmetry in external conict to compare win probabilities in
Section 4. In Section 5 and Section 6, we demonstrate the special cases of perfectly substitute
and perfectly complementary impact functions to investigate the payo¤ and rent dissipation.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Model: Collective Action and Conict Technologies
Consider two groups, A and B, that contest for a reward with common value R > 0. Each
group G(= A;B) consists of two risk-neutral players, G1 and G2. The way the reward is
allocated between the two groups depends on the collective e¤orts put forth by each group. A
groups share of the reward is further contested by the members of each group simultaneously.
Thus, members of the same group have a common interest and cooperate in external contest
against the rival group, but they are competitors against each other in the division of the
spoils. Each player chooses two di¤erent non-negative e¤orts: contributing to collective
activity for inter-group conict and contesting a given share of the reward within the group.
For the sake of simplicity we assume a linear cost function in which the total cost of e¤ort
for a player is the sum of the e¤ort in the internal conict and the external conict. Player
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i in group A (B) allocates ai (bi) units of e¤ort towards internal conict and i (i) units
of e¤ort for collective action towards external conict. We assume complete information and
that all players make their decisions simultaneously.
Internal Conict. Contrary to a substantial part of the literature, we assume players
within a group to be heterogeneous by ability or power, where power is dened in terms of
advantage conferred in internal conict. Without any loss of generality, we designate player
1 of each group to have at least as much power as player 2 and thus to have (weak) advantage
in internal conict. This advantage is embedded in the conict technology. Let pG(x1; x2)
be the probability that player 1 wins in the internal conict when x1 and x2 are the internal
e¤ort levels exerted by player 1 and 2; with x = a when G = A, and x = b when G = B.
Then, internal conict is resolved by a Tullock (1980) type contest. The contest success
function (CSF) in group G is given by
pG(x1; x2) =
8><>:
xm1
xm1 +Gx
m
2
; if x1 + x2 6= 0
1
2 , otherwise.
where G 2 [0; 1] , and G = A;B:
The probability that player 2 wins is simply 1  pG. The parameter G represents asym-
metry in power distribution within group G, with a higher G implying a more even power
distribution.6 For instance, if G = 1; the power is evenly distributed between the two
players, whereas if G = 0, all the power in internal conict is possessed by player 1 with
pG(x1; x2) = 1: We refer to player 1 as the stronger player and player 2 as the weaker player.
We also refer to a decrease in G as an increase in the power asymmetry within group G.
Collective Action. Let F (y1; y2) : R2+ ! R+ refer to an impact function that represents
collective action of a group in external conict when the stronger and weaker players con-
tribute y1 and y2, with y =  when G = A, and y =  when G = B. As discussed
6One way to interpret this function is that player 1 has some advantage within the group in terms of
education, experience, incumbency, technology etc. This specication is introduced by Gradstein (1995).
See Skaperdas (1996) and especially Clark and Riis (1998) for axiomatization of this type of contest success
function. In this study we focus on Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria, and impose the condition m 2 (0; 2) to
ensure equilibrium in pure strategies.
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earlier, in the existing literature, collective action is usually assumed to be a sum of each
individuals e¤ort. This assumption of a perfectly substitute impact function ignores any
possibility of complementary e¤ects in collective action. However, there are a wide variety
of situations in which collective action cannot be treated as the sum of individual members
e¤ort.7 We capture the issues of complementarity in collective action by introducing a CES
impact function as follows.
F (yi; yj) =

yri + y
r
j
 1
r
From the properties of a CES function, one can note that (i) F (yi; yj) is concave, Fi(yi; yj) 
0, Fii(yi; yj)  0, and Fij(yi; yj)  0, where i; j = 1; 2 with i 6= j and the subscripts indicate
partial di¤erentiation. Hence, collective action is increasing in each members contribution,
but at a diminishing rate. (ii) This impact function is designed to have a constant returns to
scale. (iii) r 2 [ 1; 1] represents the degree of complementarity between individualse¤orts.
External Conict. The group conict technology is assumed to be driven by a logit-type
contest success function (axiomatized by Münster, 2009). Let q(F (1; 2); F (1; 2)) denote
the probability that group A wins in external conict. Hence:
q(F (1; 2); F (1; 2)) =
8><>:
F (1;2)
F (1;2)+F (1;2)
, if F (1; 2) + F (1; 2) 6= 0
1
2 , otherwise
The probability that group B wins is simply 1  q. To economize on notation, we will often
use  = (1; 2) and  = (1; 2). For instance, q(;) =
F ()
F ()+F () .
Our formulation assumes that each player makes a decision on his choice of e¤ort in
internal and external conicts simultaneously. It is particularly useful if we interpret q(;)
as the probability that group A wins in a winner-take-all external contest. However, if we
take the alternative, non-probabilistic, interpretation of q(;) as the share of As contested
7For example, Scully (1995) states "[p]layers interact with one another in team sports. The degree of
interaction among player skills determines the nature of the production function." Also, in the early literature
of voluntary contributions to a public good, Hirshleifer (1983) studies the possible complementary e¤ect in
collective action. Borland (2007) also argues that while the production function in baseball is nearly additive
in the sense that hitting and pitching are separate activities, playerse¤orts are almost perfect complements
in American football. See Konrad (2009) chapters 5.5 and 6.3 for detailed discussion in this.
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resource, the analyses will still work. In the following we will interpret our results in terms
of winner-take-all probabilities in both within and between group contests.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Internal Conict within Groups
The players in group A maximize the objective functions represented by
VA1 = pA(a1; a2)q(;)R  a1   1
VA2 = [1  pA(a1; a2)]q(;)R  a2   2:
Similarly, the objective functions for the players in group B are given by
VB1 = pB(b1; b2)[1  q(;)]R  b1   1
VB2 = [1  pB(b1; b2)][1  q(;)]R  b2   2:
We rst derive an invariance result that each players winning probability in their internal
conict (p; 1  p) is independent of the level of their contributions to external conict (;).
The equilibrium probability of winning in internal conict depends only on the respective
groups power distribution parameter G. This result, summarized in the following Lemma,
considerably simplies our analysis.8
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, both the stronger and the weaker players of group G choose the
same level of e¤orts for internal conict ( a1 = a2 and b1 = b2). As a result, the winning
probabilities for the stronger and the weaker players depend only on G; pA(a1; a2) =
1
1+A
and pB(b1; b2) =
1
1+B
:
8 In this and in the next section we focus on r 2 ( 1; 1) and consider the corner cases of perfectly substitute
and perfectly complement in the subsequent sections. Also, following Marchi (2008) we consider only the cases
where the Gonzi condition in the payo¤ functions are satised. This ensures both existence, and FOC to be
su¢ cient for the maximization problem. This, however, does not assure uniqueness. As will be shown in
the next section, multiple equilibria may exist for symmetric within group power; or for the extreme case of
perfect complementary collective technology even for power asymmetry within groups.
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To investigate the relationship between the rent dissipation in internal conict and the
power distribution within each group, let us dene
A =
a1 + a2
q(;)R
and B =
b1 + b2
[1  q(;)]R:
The denominator of G represents the expected value of the collective prize for group G in the
external conict whereas the numerator of G is the total e¤ort expended in internal conict.
Thus, G is the equilibrium rate of rent dissipation in internal conict. It measures the level
of resources used up for internal conict relative to the expected value of collective prize
for group G. The next lemma shows that the group with less power-asymmetry dissipates
proportionately more rent out of their expected group prize in internal conict. In this sense,
the group with more even power distribution is more conictive.
Lemma 2 A R B as A R B.
Without loss of generality, for the rest of the analyses, we assume A  B, i.e., the power
is more asymmetric in group A compared to group B. This implies that group B is more
conictive than group A. This, however, does not necessarily mean that players in group
B spend more resource for internal conict. Since the total e¤orts depend on the size of
contestable expected prize, players in group A may expend more e¤orts in internal conict if
group As winning probability is much larger in the external conict.
3.2 External Conict between Groups
Now we study how the inter-group conict is shaped by the intensity of internal conict
and the distribution of power within each group. With the invariance result from Lemma
1, we can state each players objective function in relation to their contribution to external
conict.9 For notational simplicity, we denote the equilibrium probability that player 1 wins
9Casual observation might suggest that the role of power disparity in this model is providing an exogenous
division rule of the prize. This is not true because the playerse¤ort levels are important in our comparison
of the equilibrium payo¤s and the rent-dissipation.
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in group G by pG. For the members of group A; the payo¤ can be written as follows.
VA1 = pAq(;)R  a1   1
VA2 = (1  pA)q(;)R  a2   2:
For external conict, player i in group A maximizes his payo¤ function VAi by choosing i,
where i = 1; 2, given that all players act optimally. One can derive similar conditions for
group B members who choose i; and the rst-order conditions can be expressed as
F1()F ()
[F () + F ()]2
R =
1
pA
= (1 + A); (1)
F2()F ()
[F () + F ()]2
R =
1
1  pA = (
1 + A
A
); (2)
F ()F1()
[F () + F ()]2
R =
1
pB
= (1 + B); and (3)
F ()F2()
[F () + F ()]2
R =
1
1  pB = (
1 + B
B
): (4)
They can be further manipulated and summarized in the following way.
F1()
F2()
=
1  pA
pA
= A; (5)
F1()
F2()
=
1  pB
pB
= B; (6)
F1()
F1()
F ()
F ()
=
pB
pA
=

1 + A
1 + B

; and (7)
F2()
F2()
F ()
F ()
=
1  pB
1  pA =

B
A

1 + A
1 + B

(8)
Equations (5) and (6) tell us about the relationship between the marginal contributions of
players 1 and 2 in the generation of collective action in each group. In each group, the weaker
players equilibrium marginal contribution to the collective action is greater than the stronger
players. This is because the player with less internal power is expected to receive a smaller
share of the prize in external contest. This asymmetry in the relative marginal contributions
of the two players translates into the asymmetry in the relative total contributions. Each
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players incentive to contribute to collective action depends on ones power in the internal
conict. Hence, the relative contribution of player 1 is greater in the less conictive group A.
This leads us to the following result.
Proposition 1 The stronger players relative contribution to external conict vis-a-vis the
weaker players is higher in group A where power distribution is relatively more asymmetric,
i.e., 

1
2
 12 as A  B or; pA  pB.
One important implication of this result is that the two groups exhibit di¤erent patterns
of ine¢ ciency. Clearly, the generation of collective action in each group is ine¢ cient, because
e¢ ciency requires that an individual is compensated with full marginal return of ones e¤ort.
It is easy to note that the ine¢ ciency in terms of player 2 (player 1) is more pronounced for
group A (B) in which the internal power distribution is more asymmetric (symmetric).
4 Win Probability in External Conict
A basic, but unanswered, question is which group has a higher winning probability in external
conict, i.e., whether q(;) is greater than 1=2 or not. This is equivalent to asking whether
F (1;

2)
F (1;

2)
 1. Equations (7) and (8) together result in
F (1; 2)
F (1; 

2)
=

1 + B
1 + A

A
B   A

F2(

1; 

2)
F2(

1; 

2)
  F1(

1; 

2)
F1(

1; 

2)

: (9)
This shows that the answer hinges on the ratio of marginal contributions between stronger
and weaker players in equilibrium. Thus, the way in which collective action is generated
through individual contributions is crucial to predicting which group will win. In addition, it
is worthwhile to study how each groups winning probability is changed by the distribution
of power within a group.
An important factor in collective action is a possible complementarity between individual
memberscontributions. The elasticity of substitution in the CES function is 11 r ; which is a
measure of the degree of complementarity (or substitutability) between individual members
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contributions. As r increases, the contributions of the two players in the same group become
less complementary (more substitutable).10 In the next proposition we derive the relationship
between the properties of the group impact function and the group winning probability.
Proposition 2 If the individualscontributions are relatively complementary in the genera-
tion of collective action common to both groups, the winning probability of more conictive
group is greater, and vice versa, i.e., F (1; 2) R F (1; 2) as r R 1=2.
At a rst sight, the result in Proposition 2 appears to be counter-intuitive. Under cir-
cumstances in which collective action requires complementary e¤orts, the individuals in the
more conictive group contribute to collective action more than in the less conictive group.
Conventional wisdom advises that conict harms cooperation. However, our result implies
that conict and cooperation can coexist well, in particular, in situations of complementary
collective action.
In the case of military alliances, the individualscontributions are more likely to be sub-
stitutable. Thus, our model predicts that leadership in each alliance matters in external
conict. In fact, in the Cold War era, superpower dominance was at issue in the two military
alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, in the case of business alliances,
the individualscontributions are more likely to be complementary. For example, the com-
plementarity between the distribution capability and the manufacturing skill is one of the
most popular reasons for the strategic alliance. Thus, the size or market power of partners
needs to be similar for a strong alliance to form.
A solution for F (

1;

2)
F (1;

2)
enables us to conduct comparative statics in terms of power distri-
bution to study whether the internal redistribution of power increase or decrease the groups
winning probability. One famed argument by Olson (1965) in the context of public goods is
that the redistribution of wealth in favor of inequality can make individuals contribute to col-
lective action more, because an individual who gains a signicant proportion of total benets
from public goods has more incentive to contribute. We, however, study this issue in terms of
10While we obtain the most popular, additive impact function with no complementarity as r becomes 1; we
obtain the impact function with perfect complementarity as r becomes  1.
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power distribution in a group contest. The following Corollary is derived immediately from
the Proposition 2.
Corollary The asymmetry of power increases (decreases) the groups probability of win-
ning when the individuals contributions is relatively substitutable (complementary); i.e.,
@
@A

F (1;

2)
F (1;

2)

Q 0 and @@B

F (1;

2)
F (1;

2)

R 0 as r R 1=2:
This result conrms the intuition of Olson (1965) in a group contest setting. He argues
that more asymmetry can facilitate collective action in a public good setting when collective
action is dened as the sum of individualse¤orts (r = 1). We show that more asymmetry in
terms of power can facilitate collective action even in a group contest setting and it is valid
for any r  1=2 . In contrast, it should also be emphasized that the result can be sharply
reversed if the individualscontribution is relatively complementary as the case of r < 1=2.
When individualse¤orts are relatively substitutable or the stronger player in the group
plays a signicant role in the collective action, the redistribution of power towards the stronger
player facilitates collective action. This result is consistent with Olsons argument, as the
driving force is that the stronger players have more incentives to contribute to collective
action. By contrast, this result is sharply reversed for the specic impact functions in which
individuals e¤orts are relatively complementary or the weaker player turns out to be the
crucial player in generating collective action. Thus, in this case, a more equal distribution
of power fosters collective action. In addition, the power distribution in a rival group gives
the idea of a erce or a milder conict and this a¤ects the amount of collective action in a
similar way.
To characterize equilibria and comparative statics of the game, one can use Lemma 1
and the results from Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013) who fully characterize group con-
test with CES impact function. We can directly employ a modied version of their result
(pp. 12) and nd that the e¤ort in the external conict is independent of the degree of
complementarity when there exists no power asymmetry. However, as a simple case, when
A = B =  < 1, then in the intermediate range the e¤ort expended by the stronger player
will be 1 = 

1 =
R
4(1+)[1+()r=(1 r)] and the e¤ort expended by the weaker player will be
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2 = 

2 =
R
4(1+)[1+(1=)r=(1 r)] . Note again from the results of Kolmar and Rommeswinkel
(2013), however, that for di¤erent values of r, some cases can only be covered by a limit and
the transitions for di¤erent values of r are not smooth. It is also possible, as we will show in
the next section, to obtain multiple equilibria. As a result in the next section we focus on
the two most analyzed, and arguably most interesting polar cases of the r values.
5 Who is better o¤: the Stronger or the Weaker Player?
In addition to the issues discussed in the previous section, an implicit assumption that is
made so far to ensure the players to expend strictly positive resources is that the players
earn non-negative payo¤ in the equilibria. This is called a participation constraint. In the
standard group contests with only external conict this constraint is satised in equilibrium.
However, it may not be so obvious for this particular structure. In this section we focus
on two contrasting cases, namely perfectly substitutable (additive e¤ort, when r = 1) and
perfectly complementary (weakest link e¤ort, when r =  1) group impact functions, to
compare the equilibrium e¤ort levels and payo¤s and show that equilibrium exists - for which
the participation constraint is also satised.
In the case of additive e¤ort group impact function, collective action is performed by
the sum of individual group memberse¤orts, i.e., F (yi; yj) = yi + yj . In the case of weakest
link group impact function, the minimum e¤ort among individual group members establishes
the level of collective action, i.e., F (yi; yj) = minfyi; yjg. We can compute the equilibrium
e¤ort levels in external conict as follows. The proof of this lemma comes directly from Baik
(1993) and Lee (2012) and is not included.
Lemma 3 (1) Suppose F (yi; yj) = yi + yj. In this case, weaker players completely free-ride
in contributing to collective action.
1 =
p2ApB
[pA + pB]
2R =
B
[2 + B + B]
2R 
pAp
2
B
[pA + pB]
2R =
A
[2 + B + B]
2R = 

1 and 

2 = 

2 = 0:
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(2) Suppose F (yi; yj) = minfyi; yjg. There are multiple equilibria, but we focus on the
payo¤-dominant outcome and obtain
1 = 

2 =
[1  pA]2 [1  pB]
[1  pA + 1  pB]2
R =
2AB(1 + B)
[2AB + A + B]
2R
 [1  pA] [1  pB]
2
[1  pA + 1  pB]2
R =
AB
2(1 + A)
[2AB + A + B]
2R = 

1 = 

2:
For additive e¤ort, the winning probability in the external conict depends only on the
stronger playerse¤ort. Thus, the less conictive groups winning probability is always higher,
i.e.,
For F (yi; yj) = yi + yj , q(;) =
pA
pA + pB
 1=2:
In the case of weakest-link, as is well-known, multiple equilibria emerge. We select the largest
matched e¤ort level because it gives the highest equilibrium payo¤s to each player in each
group and turns out to be the coalition proof equilibrium (Lee, 2012). Then, the collective
action is virtually determined by the weaker players, because the stronger players merely
make the same e¤ort as much as the weaker players in own group. In this case, the more
conictive groups winning probability is always higher, i.e.,
For F (yi; yj) = minfyi; yjg, q(;) = 1  pA
1  pA + 1  pB  1=2:
In this sense, these two polar cases make our earlier argument in Proposition 2 and the
corresponding Corollary even clearer.
Now, let us compare the equilibrium payo¤s of the two players within a group. The
following Proposition shows that the stronger players earn higher payo¤ in the weakest link
e¤ort case. However, in the case of additive e¤ort, the result is very di¤erent.
Proposition 3 In the weakest-link case, V G1  V G2 always for G = A;B. In contrast, in
the additive e¤ort case, we obtain
V A1  V A2 and V B1  V B2 only if B 
A
2 + 2A   1
(1  A) and A 
B
2 + 2B   1
(1  B) :
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This result is illustrated in Figure 1. Since we conne our attention to B  A, we
focus on the area above the 45 degree line. Loosely speaking, the result implies that when
the power asymmetry among the group members is small enough ( is high enough), then
the weaker player has a higher payo¤ than the stronger player. This is because the weaker
players free riding benet is large despite his small share of the prize when the asymmetry
is small enough. In addition, since the relative benet of free riding is greater in the more
conictive group, the parameter range in which the weaker players payo¤ is greater is larger
in the more conictive group. This becomes completely clear when we consider the polar
case,  = A = B: In this case the result reduces to V G1 R V G2 as G Q 1=2:
Getting back to the issue of existence and participation constraint for equilibria, it can
be noted that for both the cases showing existence is trivial. Given the e¤ort choices of
other players, a player does not deviate from the e¤ort choice outlined in an equilibrium.
Furthermore, it is easy to show that the equilibrium payo¤s (for the additive case and for
the coalition proof weakest link case) of the players are non-negative. Below we provide a
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summary of the result for  = A = B and m = 1 and in the next section we provide a
broader discussion regarding rent dissipation.
Example. For the case of weakest-link impact function F (yi; yj) = min fyi; yjg ; we nd
a = 
(1+)2
R
2 and 
 = 1+
R
4 from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 respectively. Each players
symmetric equilibrium payo¤ is
V = p(a)q()R  a    = R
4

1  3
(1 + )2

 0
for any  2 [0; 1] : Similarly, for the case of additive impact function F (yi; yj) = yi + yj , we
obtain a = 
(1+)2
R
2 and 
 = 
(1+)2
R
8 : Each players symmetric equilibrium payo¤ is
V = p(a)q()R  a    = R
4

1  5
2(1 + )2

 0
for any  2 [0; 1] :
6 Equilibrium Rent Dissipation
In this section, we compute the total equilibrium rent dissipation, (a1 + a2 + 1 + 2)=R +
(b1 + b2 + 

1 + 

2)=R; and analyze how this changes with the power asymmetry. Note that
it measures the total e¤orts relative to the value of the prize, R. We have already derived
i and 

i in the previous section, and here we nd a

i and b

i for the two impact functions,
respectively. Since we are interested in the e¤ect of the power asymmetry on the total rent
dissipation across the groups, we now assume symmetric power asymmetry across the groups,
i.e.,  = A = B and p() = pA = pB = 1=(1 + ). We rst derive the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 Under symmetric power asymmetry across the groups, the rent dissipation in
internal conict is the same in the additive and the weakest link e¤ort cases.
This result allows us to pin down the total rent dissipation for the contest. It is summa-
rized in the next Proposition.
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Proposition 4 Under the same power asymmetry across groups, in the weakest-link case,
the total rent dissipation is monotonically increasing in . In the additive e¤ort case, the total
rent dissipation 2p()(54   p()) is increasing for  2 [0; 3=5] and decreasing for  2 (3=5; 1].
In the weakest-link case, the rent dissipation is increasing in power asymmetry, i.e., de-
creasing in p() both on external and internal conict. This is observed since when the power
asymmetry is smaller, the internal conict becomes severe. In addition, since the weaker
player determines the level of contribution to collective action, the external conict becomes
intense as well. Thus, the total rent dissipation (2p() + 1)(1   p())R is decreasing in p()
(increasing in ).
In contrast, the additive e¤ort case is more interesting. The rent dissipation on internal
conict is obviously decreasing in p() (increasing in ). However, note that the rent dis-
sipation on external conict is increasing in p() (decreasing in ). This means that more
severe the external conict more heterogeneous are the players. It is because the free-rider
problem is overshadowed as the stronger players equilibrium share of the prize is larger. As
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a result, we nd that the total rent dissipation does not behave monotonically with the power
asymmetry as follows:
This result, represented in Figure 2, has several important implications. First, it is well-
known that the rent dissipation is decreasing in the heterogeneity of the players in a single
contest model. This is no longer true in simultaneous inter and intra group contest. Second,
our result suggests that the rent dissipation is underestimated in many studies based on the
symmetric case single contest. In fact, when the group members are symmetric, the total rent
dissipation is not maximized for the additive e¤ort case. Finally, we show that simultaneous
contest can be used to ensure full rent dissipation as in the weakest link case.11
7 Discussions
We develop a model of group contest in which simultaneous within and between group conict
interplay with each other. This structure is an abstract representation of several situations
in Political Economy, Industrial and Organizational Economics and Biology. We introduce
power asymmetry within groups and complementarity in collective action to analyze their
impact on within and inter-group conicts, equilibrium payo¤ and rent dissipation. We nd
that the degree of complementarity plays a crucial role in determining collective action. As
a result, a group that faces relatively higher level of inner conict also contributes more
to the between group conict, only when the degree of complementarity is high. Having a
higher power within a group does not necessarily result in higher payo¤, when the degree of
complementarity is low.
There are interesting ways this analysis can be further pursued in terms of both relaxing
some of the assumptions and modifying the structure to incorporate other eld applications.
As we start our analysis with pre-specied groups, our analysis implicitly suggests that the
heterogeneity of individuals will be an important factor in the study of the endogenous
formation of groups. It would be an interesting exercise to extend our model to endogenize
the group formation problem. Also, in our structure the two groups share the same group
11One may be interested in the asymmetric case of A < B : We also conducted comparative statics of the
total rent dissipation with respect to t < 1 when A = tB and obtained a similar result: the rent dissipation
on external competition is increasing in t, but that on internal competition is decreasing in t.
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impact function, it will again be interesting to analyze the situation with di¤erent impact
functions. Clark and Konrad (2007), and Chowdhury and Topolyan (2013, 2014) study the
case where the attackers follow a best-shot and the defenders follow a weakest-link function,
respectively. It would be worthwhile to extend their models to be a group contest with internal
conict. Finally, we assume symmetric (unit) marginal cost of internal and external conict.
Relaxing this assumption in terms of either a general non-linear function, or by introducing
a budget (as in Hausken, 2005; Münster, 2007; Baik, 2008) may provide di¤erent analyses.
Several examples discussed in the introduction may also be analyzed by introducing a budget
constraint on the total internal and external resources. Those, in our specic structure, may
provide some new interesting features. We leave them as avenues for further research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 The Proof of Lemma 1.
The rst order conditions with respect to internal conict in group A are given by
@VA1
@a1
=
Ama
m 1
1 a
m
2
[am1 + Aa
m
2 ]
2
q(;)R  1 = 0
@VA2
@a2
=
Aa
m 1
2 a
m
1
[am1 + Aa
m
2 ]
2
q(;)R  1 = 0:
The rst-order conditions can be summarized by
a1
m
=
a2
m
=
A
(1 + A)2
q(;)R: (10)
Both the players in group A choose the same level of e¤orts, a1 = a2 (as functions of
1; 2; 1; 2) for internal conict regardless of their possibly di¤erent choice of 1 and 2
for external conict. By proceeding in a similar manner, we can also derive that
b1
m
=
b2
m
=
B
(1 + B)2
[1  q(;)]R (11)
This implies that b1 = b2. However, the total e¤ort spent on internal conict can be
di¤erent for each group. The equilibrium conditions (10) and (11) lead us to the result that
the stronger players winning probabilities in Group As internal conict is pA(a1; a2) =
1
1+A
and the same for the weaker player is 1 pA(a1; a2) = A1+A . A similar result holds for group
B internal conict with pB(b1; b2) =
1
1+B
. 
8.2 The Proof of Proposition 1.
F (:; :) is a homothetic function. This means that the slopes of the level sets of F (:; :) are the
same along rays coming from the origin. Hence, 1 (

1) must have a linear relationship with
2 (

2). Let us dene those as sA = 

2=

1 and sB = 

2=

1. Equations (5) and (6) can then
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be written as
F1(1; 

2=

1)
F2(1; 2=1)
=
F1(1; sA)
F2(1; sA)
 F1(1; sB)
F2(1; sB)
=
F1(1; 

2=

1)
F2(1; 

2=

1)
;
because Fi(yi; yj) and Fj(yi; yj) are homogeneous of degree 0. Note that
F1(1;sG)
F2(1;sG)
is increasing
in sG under Fjj(yi; yj) < 0 and Fij(yi; yj) > 0 as follows.
@
@sG

F1(1; sG)
F2(1; sG)

=
F12(1; sG)F2(1; sG)  F1(1; sG)F22(1; sG)
[F2(1; sG)]2
 0:
Therefore we must have sA = 2=1  2=1 = sB.
8.3 The Proof of Proposition 2.
Equation (5), (6), (7), and (8) correspond to
1
2
=

1  pA
pA
 1
r 1
; (5)
1
2
=

1  pB
pB
 1
r 1
; (6)
1
1
r 1 r1 + r2
r1 + 
r
2
=
pB
pA
and (7)
2
2
r 1 r1 + r2
r1 + 
r
2
=
1  pB
1  pA : (8)
Dene  = r1 r : Putting equation (5) and (6) into (7), we obtain (
1
1
) = pBpA 
1+

pA
1 pA
 r
r 1
1+

pB
1 pB
 r
r 1
.
Plugging this into (7) again, we get 
r
1+
r
2
r1+
r
2
=
 
1+

pA
1 pA
 r
r 1
1+

pB
1 pB
 r
r 1
!1 r 
pB
pA
r
. Using this, we can
further manipulate the equation as follows.
F (1; 2)
F (1; 

2)
=

r1 + 
r
2
r1 + 
r
2
 1
r
=
0B@1 +

pA
1 pA
 r
r 1
1 +

pB
1 pB
 r
r 1
1CA
1 r
r 
pA
pB

=
0@p r1 rA + (1  pA) r1 r
p
r
1 r
B + (1  pB)
r
1 r
1A 1 rr
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Now, F (1; 2) R F (1; 2) is comparable to p

A+ (1  pA) R pB + (1  pB). Let us dene
the function,
g(x) = x + (1  x); where x  1=2:
This function is increasing in x for  > 1 and decreasing in x for  < 1, because g0(x) =
(x 1   (1   x) 1). Note that  must be greater than 0 for r < 1. Therefore, since
p(A) > p(B), F (1; 2) R F (1; 2) must correspond to  R 1, which is again equivalent
to r R 1=2.
8.4 The Proof of Proposition 4.
The di¤erence between the two playersequilibrium payo¤s in group A is written as
V A1   V A2 = (2pA   1)q(;)R  (1 + a1) + (2 + a2):
From Lemma 1, both players exert the same level of e¤ort in internal conict, i.e., a1 = a2. In
addition, from Lemma 3, in the case of weakest-link e¤ort, they also contribute the same level
of e¤ort to collective action, i.e., 1 = 2. Finally, by construction A < 1 i.e., p(A) > 1=2.
As a result, we must have V A1  V A2. The same logic applies to the players in group B. Hence,
the stronger player always has a higher payo¤ than the weaker player in the weakest-link case.
Applying the results from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, the di¤erence between the two players
equilibrium payo¤s in group A for the additive e¤ort case boils down to
V A1   V A2 = (2pA   1)q(;)R  1
=
pA
pA + pB
R

(2pA   1)  pApB
pA + pB

The stronger players advantage is a higher winning probability in internal conict. However,
the stronger players disadvantage is that only he has to contribute to external conict because
the weaker player free rides completely, 2 = 0. As a result, the stronger player has a (weakly)
higher payo¤ than the weaker player in group A in the weakest-link case only if the second
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part of the above given expression in non negative. This condition, after expressing the
probabilities in terms of the asymmetry parameter becomes B  A2+2A 1(1 A) : Similarly, in
group B, the stronger player has a (weakly) higher payo¤ than the weaker player in group A
in the weakest-link case only if A  B2+2B 1(1 B) : Combining these two conditions, we obtain
the result.
8.5 The Proof of Lemma 4.
Inserting q(;) into (10) and (11), we obtain
For F (yi; yj) = yi + yj ,
8><>: a

1 = a

2 =
p2A(1 pA)
pA+pB
R
b1 = b2 =
p2B(1 pB)
pA+pB
R
For F (yi; yj) = minfyi; yjg,
8><>: a

1 = a

2 =
pA(1 pA)2
(1 pA)+(1 pB)R
b1 = b2 =
pB(1 pB)2
(1 pA)+(1 pB)R:
Imposing  = A = B and p() = pA = pB = 1=(1 + ), the total rent dissipation
in internal conict for both the weakest link and the additive e¤ort case turns out to be
(a1 + a2 + b1 + b2) =R = 2p()(1  p()):
8.6 The Proof of Proposition 5.
Using the results of Lemma 4, the following results can be immediately derived.
For F (yi; yj) = yi + yj ,
8><>: (

1 + 

2 + 

1 + 

2) =R =
p()
2
(a1 + a2 + b1 + b2) =R = 2p()(1  p())
For F (yi; yj) = minfyi; yjg,
8><>: (

1 + 

2 + 

1 + 

2) =R = (1  p())
(a1 + a2 + b1 + b2) =R = 2p()(1  p()):
In the weakest-link case, The total rent dissipation is: TR  (a1 + a2 + 1 + 2)=R +
(b1 + b2 + 

1 + 

2)=R = (2p() + 1)(1   p()) = 
2+3
(1+)2
: It is easy to show that d(TR)d > 0.
Hence, total rent dissipation is decreasing in the power asymmetry. In the additive e¤ort
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case TR  (a1 + a2 + 1 + 2)=R + (b1 + b2 + 1 + 2)=R = (52p()   2p()2) = 5 1(1+)2 . It
is easy to show from d(TR)d that rent dissipation is 1/2 when  = 0, is increasing and reaches
its maximum at  = 3=5 then it declines to 3/4 when  = 1:
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